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I. BACKGROUND

The global debate over the consequences of patenting essential
products, such as medicines, is not new. 1 Countries have therefore
developed divergent approaches; some countries 2 have chosen to exempt

* The Author would like to thank Professor Thomas Cottier (World Trade Institute, University of
Bern, Switzerland) and Professor Marianne Levin (Department of Law, Stockholm University,
Sweden) for their valuable comments on the first draft of this study.
** M. Monirul Azam, Ph.D., LL.M. in IP, LL.M. in Int’l Law, Department of Law, Stockholm
University, Sweden; Department of Law, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh and World Trade
Institute, University of Bern, Switzerland. monirul.azam@gmail.com.
1. See Jane O. Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India:
“Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering”? 2 (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr., Discussion
Paper No. 775, 1997), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp775.pdf (“almost 50
developing countries, which were not granted patent protection for pharmaceuticals during the
Uruguay Round, fiercely resisted including pharmaceuticals under the patent regime, claiming that
vastly higher drug prices would be associated with such patents”).
2. Countries such as Italy, Switzerland, Brazil, and India prohibited pharmaceutical patent
protection for a considerable period of time to encourage “learning by imitation” and promote the
local pharmaceutical industry. See Xuan Li, The Impact of Higher Standards in Patent Protection
for Pharmaceutical Industries under the TRIPS Agreement: A Comparative Study of China and
India, 31 WORLD ECON. 1367, 1368 (2008).
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medicines from all or parts of patent law,3 while other countries, such as
Canada and Australia, have patent regimes moderated by mechanisms to
control prices or to facilitate local production under compulsory
licenses. 4 Countries such as India, South Africa, and Brazil have adopted
other legal means to allow competitors to circumvent the negative
effects of patents by allowing the patenting of processes but not of
products. 5
While implementing a patent law that complies with the agreement
on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS or
TRIPS Agreement), 6 as adopted under the World Trade Organization
(WTO), countries such as India, Brazil, and South Africa were
confronted with two major concerns: first, the future of the local
pharmaceutical industry, and second, access to affordable medicines. 7
These countries’ reactions to TRIPS have depended much on the nature
of their pharmaceutical industry because that industry is important both
economically and socially; however, their intellectual property rights
regimes were not TRIPS-compliant. Therefore, these countries were
confronted with the issue of how to manage the continued viability of

3. Historically, product patents have been excluded from protection in most developed
countries. For example, in France, product patent protection was prohibited under a law effective
July 5, 1844, and only limited patent protection has been permitted since January 2, 1966. In
Germany, product patents were explicitly excluded under a law effective May 25, 1877, but were
then introduced on September 4, 1967. In Switzerland, product patents for pharmaceuticals were
explicitly prohibited by the Constitution and were only introduced in 1977. In Italy, pharmaceutical
patents were prohibited until 1978. In Spain, product patents were introduced in 1986, just after the
country’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), and the relevant laws came into
effect in 1992. The rationale behind not granting product patent protection for pharmaceuticals in
each of the example countries was to allow local pharmaceutical companies to imitate and produce
patented medicines by using new processes. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 216 (2008).
4. See Lydia Mugambe, The Exception to Patent Rights under the WTO-TRIPS Agreement:
Where is the Right to Health Guaranteed? 21 n.53 (Oct. 2002) (unpublished LL.M. Dissertation,
Univ. of Western Cape) (on file with author) (“In an affidavit filed in support of the Treatment
Action Campaign, Professor Colleen Flood of the University of Toronto explained how patent law
in Canada had evolved since 1923 with the ‘expressly stated goal of making food and medicine
affordable to the public’ . . . . To facilitate this, various legal devices, including compulsory
licensing and administrative mechanisms (a Patented Medicines Prices Review Board), were
established. However, in common with developing countries, Canada has been pressured to
strengthen intellectual property protection. Conversely, in Australia, the government negotiate with
industry as a monopolist purchaser and is thus able to provide drugs to the community at greatly
reduced prices under a ‘Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.’”).
5. See Li, supra note 2, at 1368-69.
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS or TRIPS Agreement].
7. See Gopakumar K. M., Product Patents and Access to Medicines in India: A Critical
Review of the Implementation of TRIPS Patent Regime, 3 LAW & DEV. REV. 326, 326 (2010).
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the local pharmaceutical industry and provide access to affordable
medicines while implementing TRIPS.
India, Brazil, and South Africa have already implemented TRIPScompliant patent laws 8 and have introduced patent protection for both
pharmaceutical products and processes. 9 Those countries’ experiences of
utilizing TRIPS flexibilities and other possible policy mechanisms
provide important lessons for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), such
as Bangladesh, as they progress toward TRIPS compliance and adopting
pharmaceutical patents.
This study analyzes the policy options used by Brazil, India, and
South Africa in their transitions to a TRIPS-compliant patent law and
their introduction of pharmaceutical patents. This comparative review
can be used to explore possible policy options that can also be utilized
by LDCs, including Bangladesh.
Although developing countries such as India, China, and Brazil,
played very vital roles as producers and exporters of generic copies of
brand-name patented products, 10 they can no longer produce such
pharmaceuticals due to the introduction of TRIPS-compliant patent
regimes in their respective countries. 11 Only LDCs like Bangladesh can
still do so, until January 1, 2016, due to the Doha waiver of 2002for
pharmaceutical patents. 12 The TRIPS Council decision of June 11, 2013,
approved another eight-year extension permitting non-compliance with

8. See Prabhu Ram, India’s New “Trips-Compliant” Patent Regime Between Drug Patents
and The Right to Health, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 195, 195 (2006); LUCIANO MARTINS COSTA
PÓVOA, ROBERTO MAZZOLENI & THIAGO CALIARI, Innovation in the Brazilian Pharmaceutical
Industry Post-TRIPS, in TRIPS COMPLIANCE, NATIONAL PATENT REGIMES & INNOVATION:
EVIDENCE & INNOVATION 16, 21 (Sunil Mani & Richard R. Nelson eds., 2013), available at
http://www.ungs.edu.ar/globelics/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/ID-197-Caliari-Mazzoleni-CaliariPrivatization-of-Knowledge-Intellectual-Property-Right.pdf; Bernard Maister & Caspar van
Woensel, Is Compliance Enough: Can the Goals of Intellectual Property Rights Be Achieved in
South Africa? 2 (Leiden Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2213263.
9. Ram, supra note 8, at 198; Catherine Tomlinson & Lotti Rutter, The Economic & Social
Case for Patent Law Reform in South Africa, Research Paper (Treatment Action Campaign), Feb.
2014, at 4, available at http://www.tac.org.za/sites/default/files/The%20Economic%20and%
20Social%20Case%20for%20Patent%20Law%20Reform%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf.
10. See Developing Countries, INT’L STAT. INST. (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.isiweb.org/component/content/article/5-root/root/81-developing.
11. India implemented a TRIPS-compliant patent law on January 1, 2005; Brazil
implemented one in May 1997; and South Africa implemented one in 1997. See Monirul Azam,
Globalizing Standards of Patent Protection in WTO Law and Policy Options for Bangladesh: An
Appraisal 10 (2011) (on file with author); William W. Fisher III & Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The South
Africa AIDS Controversy: A Case Study in Patent Law and Policy, HARV. L. SCH.: THE L. & BUS.
OF PAT. 11 (last updated Feb. 10, 2005), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/
South%20Africa.pdf.
12. Azam, supra note 11, at 3.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014

3

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 7 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 1

64

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[7:61

most TRIPS obligations until 2021, 13 which is good news for LDCs like
Bangladesh. This extension of transitional periods for LDCs concerns
the entire TRIPS Agreement (with the exception of articles 3, 4, and 5
related to national treatment and most-favored nation treatment). 14 Thus,
the extension removes LDCs’ obligations with regard to pharmaceutical
patents and data protection until at least July 1, 2021. 15 The specific
pharmaceutical waiver of 2002, which runs until January 1, 2016, could
also be subject to a different extension request that could extend well
beyond 2021. 16 These extensions create potential export markets for
generic producers from LDCs such as Bangladesh because countries that
have already implemented TRIPS-compliant patent laws, such as India
and Brazil, cannot produce generics of patented medicines. 17 Again,
these countries’ experiences will be examined herein to understand not
only how these countries implemented their TRIPS-compliant patent
laws, but also the impact these laws have had.
The TRIPS Agreement itself provides a number of flexibilities for
member states to determine their own approach regarding the
relationship between intellectual property rights and access to
pharmaceuticals. 18 The World Intellectual Property Organization
Committee on Development and Intellectual Property defines
flexibilities as “legal tools that countries can use as they see fit in their
national developmental plans and within the framework of the
mandatory standards of international obligations.” 19 In the context of the
TRIPS Agreement, the Committee further stated, “the term flexibilities
means that there are different options through which TRIPS obligations
can be transposed into national law so that national interests are
accommodated and yet TRIPS provisions and principles are complied
with.” 20 The TRIPS Agreement permits the following flexibilities:
13. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the
Transition Period under Article 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members, IP/C/64 (June 11,
2013), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/7_1_ipc64_e.pdf.
14. Id.
15. E-mail from Ellen ‘t Hoen to E-drug readers (June 12, 2013, 14:36 +0200), available at
http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/201306/msg00010.php.
16. Id.
17. Azam, supra note 11.
18. “Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall
not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.
Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 1.1.
19. See World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Patent Related Flexibilities in the
Multilateral Legal Framework and Their Legislative Implementation at the National and Regional
Levels, at 3, CDIP/5/4 (Mar. 1, 2010).
20. Id. at 12.
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Define the nature of the invention and regulate the criteria of
patentability within the broad framework of TRIPS Agreement rules;
Establish exceptions to patent rights;
Grant government use and compulsory licenses;
Provide a range of options with respect to the protection of data
submitted for regulatory purposes;
Determine country-based policies with respect to exhaustion of rights
and allow parallel importation of medicines;
Utilize the “unfair commercial use” option of “protection of
undisclosed test data,” which can be restricted and limited to promote
generic competition and reduce prices. 21

However, these flexibilities are ambiguous and therefore should be
implemented at the national level by considering national developmental
goals, the public interest, and the particular country’s stage of
development. 22 The experiences of Brazil, India, and South Africa will
be examined herein against the available TRIPS flexibilities – and other
governmental interventions that do not conflict with the TRIPS
obligations – so as to determine legislative and policy options that LDCs
like Bangladesh might adopt.
II. THE EXPERIENCE OF BRAZIL
Brazil’s experience regarding TRIPS-compliant patent law for
pharmaceuticals and its societal and national obligation to ensure access
to medicines represents a situation in which exploitation by
multinational pharmaceutical companies was largely thwarted. This
attempted exploitation also gave way to significant reforms in public
health policy and reinstated local drug companies as viable contenders in

21. Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement requires member countries to establish protection
for submitted test data. However, this requirement is in fact narrowly construed, and countries
maintain substantial flexibility in implementation. The public interest in limiting protection for data
is to promote competition and to ensure that data protection does not become the means to block the
timely entrance of generic competitors to off-patent drugs, because generic competitors drive down
price and thereby promote greater access to medicines. See CARLOS M. CORREA, PROTECTION OF
DATA SUBMITTED FOR THE REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING THE
STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 47 n.30 (2002).
22. See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 6-7 (2000); see also
CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY
162 (2006).
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the domestic market. 23
Brazil’s public health oriented, TRIPS-compliant approach could be
a perfect model for other developing countries and LDCs to utilize.
Economic and technological collaboration between the public and
private sectors have created a favorable condition for political alliance as
well as hospitable ground for balancing local pharmaceutical innovation
and access to medicines. 24 Brazil, with a population of over 180 million,
is not only an important pharmaceutical market (with sales estimated at
$12.7 billion in 2008), 25 it is also an important center for research and
development (R&D) with clinical trial facilities, low development costs,
and qualified professionals. 26 Although the Brazilian pharmaceutical
industry is dominated by multinational corporations, issues surrounding
access to medicines have come to the forefront: affordability is one of
the main problems in Brazilian health care.27 About 20% of the 370
established pharmaceutical companies in Brazil are foreign (mainly from
Europe or the United States), and it is estimated that they control about
70% percent of the pharmaceutical market in Brazil.28 Given this
tension, Brazil has attempted to create a balance within its intellectual
property regime between pharmaceutical innovation and access to
medicines.
In 1883, Brazil was one of 16 countries that signed the Paris
Convention. 29 This pre-TRIPS convention allowed countries to utilize
the patent system as an instrument of economic and technological
development. 30 Under the Paris Convention, each country could

23. See MATTHEW FLYNN, Corporate Power and State Resistance: Brazil’s Use of TRIPS
Flexibilities for its National AIDS Program, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PHARMACEUTICALS AND
PUBLIC HEALTH - ACCESS TO DRUGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 149, 149-50 (Kenneth C. Shadlen
et al. eds., 2011).
24. See Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The
Industrial Bases of Health Policies, 42 COMP. POL. 41, 55 (2009).
25. Press Release, Business Wire, Research and Markets: Pharmaceutical Pricing and
Reimbursement in Brazil: Population and Demand for Pharmaceuticals is Forecast to Increase in the
Next 12 Years (Jan. 5, 2010) (on file with author).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Kermani Faiz, Brazil-Not a Market for Faint Hearted, CONTRACT PHARMA (Oct. 11,
2005), http://www.contractpharma.com/issues/2005-10/view_features/regional-roundup-brazil/.
29. Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira et al., Brazilian Intellectual Property Legislation, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT: CHALLENGES FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH 151, 153 (Jorge A. Z. Bermudez & Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira eds., 2004). See
also
WIPO-Administered
Treaties,
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=2 (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
30. See WIPO, The Impact of the International Patent System on Developing Countries: A
Study by Getachew Mengistie, at 16 (Aug. 15, 2003), www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/
a_39/a_39_13_add_1.doc.
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establish its own intellectual property regime in a way that would favor
its own national policies.31 Brazilian industrial property legislation
granted patent protection for pharmaceutical processes and products
until 1945. 32 In fact, Brazil was the fourth country in the world and the
first county in Latin America to protect the rights of inventors.33
The 1945 legislation was modified to exclude the protection of
inventions related to foodstuffs, medicines, materials, and substances
obtained by chemical means or processes. 34 In 1969, a change in the
Brazilian Industrial Property Code completely eliminated patenting in
the pharmaceutical sector. 35 However, when Brazil became a member of
the WTO, 36 it was required to implement a TRIPS-compliant patent
regime that included patent protection for both pharmaceutical products
and processes. 37 Brazil institutionalized the TRIPS Agreement by a
Presidential Decree in December 1994, 38 and its TRIPS-compliant
regime came into effect on May 14, 1996, thereby instituting both
pharmaceutical product and process protection. 39
Brazil began granting patents in the pharmaceutical sector in May
1997. 40 Brazil was criticized by public health groups for implementing a
TRIPS-compliant law41 that failed to fully utilize the flexibilities and
safeguards in the TRIPS Agreement and failed to ensure access to
medicines. 42 Given this criticism, the Brazilian government took steps to
facilitate access to drugs by introducing a number of amendments to its
patent law, including a strong compulsory licensing regime. 43 In
response to these provisions, multinational pharmaceutical companies
and developed countries, particularly the United States, objected,44 and a
WTO dispute was initiated by the United States against Brazil.45 Daya
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Oliveira et al., supra note 29, at 154.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Brazil has been a member of the WTO since January 1, 1995. Brazil and the WTO,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/brazil_e.htm (last visited
Nov. 18, 2014).
37. See John T. Masterson, Jr., Overview of Intellectual Property Rights and the TRIPS
Agreement, COMMERCE.GOV (Aug. 12, 2002), http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/ipr.html.
38. Oliveira et al., supra note 29, at 153.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Chakravarthi Raghavan, U.S. to Withdraw TRIPS Dispute against Brazil, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK (June 25, 2001), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/withdraw.htm.
43. Faiz, supra note 28.
44. Oliveira et al., supra note 29.
45. On January 31, 2001, the United States requested a WTO Dispute-Settlement Panel to
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Shanker noted the main points of contention between the United States
and Brazil: local working requirements in the Brazilian Industrial
Property Law, parallel importing in the same law, and Brazil’s request
for consultation for the alleged violation of WTO provisions in United
States patent law (regarding patents that were developed with the help of
public funding). 46
In its complaint, the United States asserted that article 68 of
Brazil’s Industrial Property Law imposed a requirement that a patent be
subject to compulsory licensing if not worked in the territory of Brazil,
not used to manufacture the product in Brazil, or the patented process
was not used in Brazil. 47 The United States viewed these provisions as
conflicting with articles 27.1 48 and 28.1 49 of the TRIPS Agreement. The
Brazilian law also provided that if a patent owner chose to exploit the
patent through importation, others could either import the patented
product or obtain the product from the patented process. 50 As
Chakravarthi Raghavan stated that “the Brazilian law also provided that
if a patent owner chose to exploit the patent through importation, others
could either import the patented product or obtain the product from the
patented process.” 51
In reply to the complaint, Brazil contended that articles 204 52 and
resolve its differences with Brazil over Brazil’s 1996 Industrial Property Law. See Dispute
Settlement: Dispute DS224, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds224_e.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
46. Daya Shanker, Fault Lines in the World Trade Organization: An Analysis of the TRIPS
Agreement and Developing Countries 33 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Wollongong), available at http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/497.
47. Article 68(I) of Brazilian Industrial Property Law provides that the following will
occasion a compulsory license: “non-exploitation of the object of the patent within the Brazilian
territory for failure to manufacture or incomplete manufacture of the product, or also failure to make
full use of the patented process, except cases where this is not economically feasible, when
importation shall be permitted[.]”
48. Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, provides that “patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application . . . [P]atents
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the
field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.”
49. Article 28(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, deals with the exclusive rights of
the patent owner to “prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making,
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product.”
50. See Raghavan, supra note 42.
51. Id.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 204 (2012) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no small
business firm or nonprofit organization which receives title to any subject invention and no assignee
of any such small business firm or non-profit organization shall grant to any person the exclusive
right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States unless such person agrees that any
products embodying the subject invention or produced through the use of the subject invention will
be manufactured substantially in the United States.”).
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209 53 of the United States patent code 54 had similar provisions;
consequently, Brazil raised a dispute against the United States over these
provisions. 55 In the end, the complaint was withdrawn due to pressure
from public health organizations and human rights groups both from
within and outside the United States. 56 Daya Shanker noted that
the weakness of [Brazil’s] position was known to the United States[,]
but the main purpose of initiating the dispute appear[s] to be to
communicate potential United States displeasure and possible action
against weak and poor countries of the Third World so that they would
not incorporate such provisions in their patent acts and should such
provisions have already been incorporated in their patent acts, that they
would not use them. 57

The success of the United States action was evident from the fact
that South Africa, Kenya, and many other African countries refrained
from using local working provisions to manufacture anti-AIDS
pharmaceuticals even when a substantial part of their population was
suffering from AIDS. 58
However, Brazil managed to obtain price reductions from big
pharmaceutical companies by threatening to break patents through the
issue of a compulsory license. 59 For example, in 2007, Brazil decided to
53. 35 U.S.C. § 209 (2012) (“[I]n the case of an invention covered by a foreign patent
application or patent, the interests of the Federal Government or United States industry in foreign
commerce will be enhanced . . . . A Federal agency shall normally grant a license . . . to use or sell
any federally owned invention in the United States only to a licensee who agrees that any products
embodying the invention or produced through the use of the invention will be manufactured
substantially in the United States.”).
54. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006).
55. The United States Patent Law, as consolidated in 2007, among other things, provides that
when any patent is obtained, as a result of research funded by the United States and its
governmental agencies, the patent should be worked in the United States and cannot be licensed for
production elsewhere. See 35 U.S.C. § 209 (2012).
56. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and other public health groups, along with 120
Brazilian non-governmental organizations, requested the United States government withdraw its
request for a WTO dispute settlement procedure on the Brazilian patent law. The United States
brought a complaint before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in Geneva, requesting
measures that might handicap the successful Brazilian AIDS program, which is largely based on
Brazil’s ability to manufacture affordable treatment. See GATT Secretariat, Dispute Settlement:
Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1 (July 5, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds199_e.htm.
57. Shanker, supra note 46, at 111.
58. See Daya Shanker, India, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS, 5 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 315, 331 (2002); see also Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents
for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1886, 1886 (2001).
59. See Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions:
Evaluating the Options, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 249-50 (2009).
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issue a compulsory license for the HIV drug Storcrin (the brand name
for Efavirenz) after failing to secure a considerable discount from the
patent owner. 60 The then-President of Brazil signed a compulsory
license for Efavirenz on the grounds of public interest, 61 which permitted
the purchase of the patented pharmaceutical from generic suppliers.62
Brazil also established certain rules concerning the granting of
compulsory licenses in cases of national emergency and public
interest. 63 The definition of public interest is broad, “including such
matters as public health, nutrition, the protection of the environment, and
elements of primordial importance for technological, social or economic
development. The possibility to provide compulsory licensing in each of
these cases implies that the fulfillment of the [country’s] most basic
needs would be covered.” 64 Thus, Brazil successfully utilized the
compulsory license flexibility of TRIPS to protect public health.
In addition to compulsory license provisions, Brazilian law also
utilized other TRIPS flexibilities such as parallel importing; 65
experimental use, early working, or Bolar exceptions; 66 and a strict
novelty requirement. 67 Using parallel-import flexibility, Brazil permitted

60. See generally James Packard Love, Recent Examples of the Use of Compulsory Licenses
on Patents, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Research Note 2007:2), available at
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls.pdf; Stephen Jenei, Brazil Signs Compulsory License
for Efavirenz, PATENT BARISTAS (June 6, 2007), http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2007
/06/06/brazil-signs-compulsory-license-for-efavirenz/.
61. See Garima Gupta & Avih Rastogi, Intellectual Property Rights: Who Needs Them? 230
(Ctr. for Civ. Soc’y, Working Paper No. 0040, 2002), available at http://ccs.in/internship_papers/
2002/24.pdf.
62. See Sangeeta Shashikant, Brazil Moves on Compulsory License After Failed Talks with
Drug Company, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (May 3, 2007), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2
/wto.info/twninfo050703.htm (“The Ministerial Ordinance No. 866 dated April 24, 2007 declared
that ‘there exists the possibility of compulsory licensing of patents in the public interest,’ as
provided for in national laws, and decided ‘to declare public interest in relation to Efavirenz for the
purposes of the granting of compulsory licensing for public non-commercial use, in order to
guarantee the practicability of the National STD and AIDS Programme, ensuring the continuity of
universal and free access to all medicines necessary for the treatment of people living with HIV and
AIDS.’”).
63. Decreto No. 3.201, de 6 de Outubro de 1999, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
6.10.1999 (Braz.) (translated to English).
64. Gupta & Rastogi, supra note 61.
65. Decreto No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O.U. de 14.5.1996 (Braz.) (referencing
article 43 of TRIPS).
66. This was introduced in Brazil by Law 10.196/2001 as an amendment to Articles 43 &
229 of Law 9.279. See generally Anthony Tridico et al., Facilitating Generic Drug Manufacturing:
Bolar Exemptions Worldwide, WIPO MAG., June 2014, available at http://www.wipo.int/
wipo_magazine/en/2014/03/article_0004.html (providing a discussion on Bolar exceptions, which
developed after Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
67. Decreto No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O.U. de 14.5.1996 (Braz.) (referencing
article 229 C).
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the import of pharmaceuticals that had previously been commercialized,
by the patent holder or by an authorized third party in another country, at
a lower price than the price offered in Brazil. 68
Brazilian Industrial Property Law also included a provision on
experimental flexibility, which allowed for the use of an invention
without compensating the patent holder. 69 The Bolar exception, as it
applies in Brazil, allows a company to complete all of the procedures
and tests necessary to register a generic product before the original
patent expires. 70 Bolar flexibility allows for the immediate marketing of
a generic pharmaceutical after the patent has expired, thus promoting
competition with the patent holder. 71
Another notable feature of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law is
the innovative use of novelty flexibility. The Brazilian National Institute
for Industrial Property (INPI) was criticized by health activists, local
generic producers, and lawyers for adopting an overly broad definition
of novelty, resulting in many patent applications that are simply revised
versions of already-existing, patented new molecular entities. 72 To avoid
this problem, a 1999 Presidential Decree (converted into law in 2001)
created and introduced a new provision requiring prior approval from the
National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) before granting a
patent to ensure that it will not endanger public health or create a barrier
for access to medicines. 73 Therefore, from INPI forward, all

68. In September 2003, Decree 4.830 also allowed for the importation of the object from
countries where the product is not patented. Therefore, Brazil has the right to import products from
any country, including those still using the transition period for pharmaceuticals, such as
Bangladesh. Decree 4.830, Sept. 4, 2003, Compulsory Licensing in the Case of National Emergency
and Public Interest (translated to English).
69. Decreto No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O.U. de 14.5.1996 (Braz.) (referencing
article 43).
70. Indus. Prop. Amendment Law 10.196 modified articles 43 and 229 of Law 9.279. Article
43, which describes the limits of rights conferred to the patent holder (Exception to Rights
Conferred), was amended to include the Bolar exception (early working) to allow local generic
producers to complete all of the procedures and tests that are necessary to register a generic product
before the original patent expires.
71. This can ultimately lower the price of medicines. The WTO Panel in the EC–Canada
case validated the Bolar exception as compatible with article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. See
Report of the Panel, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 4.15, WT/DS114/R
(Mar. 17, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf; see also
Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD],
ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Issue Paper No. 17, at 13-14 (2006)
(by Christopher Garrison), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc200612_en.pdf.
72. See Shadlen, supra note 24, at 46.
73. See Lei No. 10.196, de 14 de Fevereiro de 2001, COL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL, 62,
Fevereiro 2001 (Braz.); see also Dannemann Siemsen & Eduardo da Gama Camara Junior,
Prosecution of Pharmaceutical Patents in Brazil: Tensions Between the Brazilian Patent Office and
ANVISA, LEXOLOGY (July 22, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=11c9730b-
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pharmaceutical patent applications must go through ANVISA, and these
patents can only issue after receiving prior consent from ANVISA. 74
ANVISA denies patents to drugs that lack genuine novelty and where it
adjudges that providing exclusive rights would be harmful to public
health. 75 ANVISA also uses its authority to prevent patents that would
extend the terms of existing patents. 76
In December 2010, the Brazilian Senate approved the text of a new
Competition Act, which had been pending in the Brazilian Parliament
since 2005, and finally entered into force on May 29, 2012. 77 It is
expected that this law will help Brazil prevent both excessive pricing
and abuse of the dominant position by the pharmaceutical industry. 78
However, this law has yet to be tested in the pharmaceutical sector. 79
Brazil also adopted price control regulations, which empowered the
Ministry of Health to evaluate the therapeutic advantage of a new
patented medicine over an existing treatment and then determine a price
ceiling based on the lowest price of the drug in several countries,
including the country of origin. 80
08b9-447e-9d87-f1c82b52d25d (“ANVISA has started to examine pharmaceutical applications after
Provisional Presidential Decree N[o.] 2006/1999 was issued, which created the legal procedure of
prior consent”).
74. ANVISA’s intellectual property division was established in 2001 and is housed in INPI’s
Rio de Janeiro office building.
75. BERMUDEZ OLIVEIRA & EGLEUBIA OLIVEIRA, Expanding Access to Essential Medicines
in Brazil: Recent Regulation and Public Policies in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT: CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 129, 136 (Jorge A. Z. Bermudez
& Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira eds., 2004).
76. See Shadlen, supra note 24, at 46.
77. Decreto No. 12.529, de 30 Novembro de 2011, D.O.U. de 30.11.2011 (Braz.). See also
Marco Botta, The Brazilian Senate Approves the Text of the New Competition Act, KLUWER
COMPETITION L. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2011), http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2011/02/07/thebrazilian-senate-approves-the-text-of-the-new-competition-act; Ana Paula Martinez & Mariana
Tavares de Araujo, Brazil’s New Competition Law One Year After Taking Effect, LEXOLOGY (June
20, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3155fa30-c311-45b5-8ced-a51f1bec14b0
(“On May 29, 2012, Law No. 12.529/11 took effect, significantly changing the landscape of
antitrust enforcement in Brazil. The law (i) consolidates the investigative, prosecutorial, and
adjudicative functions of Brazil’s three competition authorities into one independent agency; (ii)
introduces a mandatory pre-merger notification system; and (iii) introduces changes to the
administrative and criminal sanctions applicable to anticompetitive conduct.”).
78. See Loraine Hawkins, Review Series on Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies and
Interventions 14 (WHO/HAI Project on Med. Prices & Availability, Working Paper No. 4:
Competition Policy, 2011), available at http://www.haiweb.org/medicineprices/05062011/
Competition%20final%20May%202011.pdf.
79. Id.
80. Brazil created a reference price regime for new patented products in 2003. Under this
regime, the final price of a new drug in Brazil cannot exceed the lowest price among nine reference
countries, which include Australia, Canada, Spain, United States, France, Greece, Italy, New
Zealand and Portugal. See MGMT. SCI. FOR HEALTH, INC., Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy, in
MANAGING ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES 9.1, 9.9 (2012), available at
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Apart from public health oriented TRIPS flexibilities, the local
pharmaceutical sector in Brazil also benefited from significant
government investment in research and production through the Brazilian
Ministry of Health. 81 It was stated by Maurice Cassier and Marilena
Correa that the Ministry of Health (of Brazil) acting as “health
entrepreneur” does not just purchase drugs but also takes an active role
in their production. 82
By using the flexibilities inherent in the TRIPS Agreement and
governmental investment in R&D, Brazil was able to balance the need
for pharmaceutical innovation with the public health concern of access
to medicines.
III. THE EXPERIENCE OF INDIA
India took a similar vision, but a different path towards TRIPS
compliance. India entered into the WTO in 1995 and went through a
long process of amendments toward a TRIPS-compliant patent regime,
which became effective January 1, 2005. 83 The impact of stronger
intellectual patent rights created problems for the larger Indian drug
firms and greatly damaged the smaller local firms’ ability to meet the
rising costs of remuneration of experienced and efficient pharmacists
and other technical persons. 84
The Indian pharmaceutical industry, with its 8% share in global
pharmaceutical production, 85 holds the third position in terms of
volume. 86 India also enjoys a 20% share of the global generic market. 87
Indian pharmaceutical companies play an important role globally in
providing life-saving drugs at affordable prices. For instance, 70% of the
antiretroviral (ARV) drugs procured to treat HIV/AIDS under the Global
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s19585en/s19585en.pdf.
81. Brazil invested in 18 public sector labs, which mostly engage in formulation of final
dosages and, to a lesser degree, of pharmaceutical inputs. Rahim Rezaie, Brazilian Health Biotech –
Fostering Crosstalk Between Public and Private Sectors, 26 NATURE BIOTECH. 627, 642 (2008).
82. See Maurice Cassier & Marilena Correa, Intellectual Property and Public Health:
Copying of HIV/Aids Drugs by Brazilian Public and Private Pharmaceutical Laboratories, RECIIS
ELEC. J. COMMC’N, INFO. & INNOVATION IN HEALTH, Jan.-Jun. 2007, at 84.
83. Ram, supra note 8.
84. Id.
85. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PHARM. & LIFE SCIENCES, GLOBAL PHARMA LOOKS
TO INDIA: PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH 6 (2010), available at https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/
pharma/Global_Pharma_looks_to_India.pdf.
86. See
The
Indian
Pharmaceutical
Industry
Economics,
UKESSAYS,
http://www.ukessays.com/essays/economics/the-indian-pharmaceutical-industry-economicsessay.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (highlighting that the Indian pharmaceutical industry has a
current turnover of $12 billion).
87. Id.
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Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM) come from Indian
companies, and 70% of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
International Development Association (IDA), and Clinton Foundation
procurements are also from Indian companies. 88
Drugs produced in India satisfy 95% of the domestic demand, and
two-thirds of the drugs produced in India are exported to the global
market. 89 In 2007-2008, the exports of pharmaceuticals by the Indian
pharmaceutical industry were around $5.3 billion. 90 Only two
multinational corporations (MNCs), GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer, figure
in the top ten pharmaceutical companies in India. 91 Only four
multinational corporations find their place among the top twenty
pharmaceutical companies in India. 92 Although domestic companies in
India now control 80% of the domestic market, this was not the case
prior to patent policy reform in 1970; Indian companies only had a 15 %
share prior to 1970. 93 Considering this, Indian patent policy reform
provides LDCs with important lessons regarding how to utilize the
transitional periods to progress toward local pharmaceutical production
and innovation and toward TRIPS compliance.
India became an independent nation in 1947, after more than 100
years of British rule, and initially adopted the Patents and Design Act of
1911 (a British piece of legislation).94 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first
Prime Minister, was concerned about the influence and control of

88. ELLEN F.M. ‘T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY POWER
7 (2009).
89. See N. Lalitha, Access to Indian Generic Drugs: Emerging Issues, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, PHARMACEUTICALS AND PUBLIC HEALTH - ACCESS TO DRUGS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 225, 225 (Kenneth C. Shadlen et al. eds., 2011); and GEETA GOURI, COMPETITION
COMM’N OF INDIA, COMPETITION ISSUES IN THE GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY IN INDIA,
1
(2010),
http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/presentations/ComIssGenPharmIndusIndia_20100401142346.
pdf.
90. Reji K. Joseph, India’s Trade in Drugs and Pharmaceuticals: Emerging Trends,
Opportunities and Challenges, in RIS Discussion Papers, 10 (Discussion Paper No. 159, 2009),
available at http://www.eaber.org/sites/default/files/documents/RIS_Joseph_2009.pdf.
91. Rasmus Alex Wendt, TRIPS in India 160-78 (Dec. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Roskilde Univ.) (on file with author).
92. Five Years into the Product Patent Regime: India’s Response, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM:
POVERTY REDUCTION AND HIV/AIDS (2010) (by Sudip Chaudhuri et al.), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/57006246/Pharma-Response-to-Product-Patent-Regime.
93. PADMASHREE GEHL SAMPATH, UNITED NATIONS UNIV., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ACCESS
TO MEDICINE AFTER 2005: PRODUCT PATENT PROTECTION AND EMERGING FIRM STRATEGIES IN
THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 22 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/
intellectualproperty/studies/PadmashreeSampathFinal.pdf.
94. Stephen Barnes, Note, Pharmaceutical Patents and TRIPS: A Comparison of India and
South Africa, 91 KY. L.J. 911, 919-20 (2003).
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foreign companies over the Indian economy. 95 This concern was
validated in two subsequent committee reports.
The 1948 Tek Chand Committee and the 1957 Ayyangar
Committee both concluded that foreign interests were exploiting Indian
patent protection to monopolize various markets, including the
pharmaceutical market. 96 At the time of both reports, India was
dependent on foreign sources for pharmaceuticals, specifically for the
import of bulk chemicals and completed medicines. 97 The great
majority, some 90%, of the Indian pharmaceutical market was controlled
by foreign companies. 98 Indian pharmaceutical prices at that time were
among the highest in the world. 99 Initially, India sought to solve this
problem by instituting high tariffs and price controls on
pharmaceuticals. 100 India then amended its patent laws to encourage
imitation and local pharmaceutical production.101 The change came with
the passage of the Patents Act of 1970, which eliminated product patents
for pharmaceuticals and only allowed protection under a process patent
for a maximum period of seven years. 102
India thus encouraged the mass production of low-cost
pharmaceuticals at the expense of innovation. Prime Minister Indira
Ghandi, in her statement to the World Health Organization Assembly in
1982, argued that “[t]he idea of a better-ordered world is one in which
medical discoveries will be free of patents and there will be no
profiteering from life and death.” 103 Given this focus, Indian
pharmaceutical companies principally engaged in producing generic
versions of name-brand pharmaceuticals by reverse engineering those
pharmaceuticals. 104 By applying modified production processes, these
companies successfully avoided conflict with the original patent and
95. Id.; David K. Tomar, A Look into the WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Between the
United States and India, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 579, 581 (1999).
96. Barnes, supra note 94, at 920.
97. See William Greene, The Emergence of India’s Pharmaceutical Industry and
Implications for the U.S. Generic Drug Market 2 (USITC Office of Econ., Working Paper No.
2007-05-A,
2007),
available
at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/
EC200705A.pdf.
98. Tomar, supra note 95, at 582.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Intellectual Property Rights Protection in Developing
Countries: The Case of Pharmaceuticals, Lecture Before the European Economic Association’s
Congress in Barcelona (Aug. 2009), in 8 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 31 (2010), available at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~pg87/Goldberg_Marshall.pdf.
102. The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (2012), § 53(1)(a).
103. Goldberg, supra note 101.
104. See Susan Finston, India: A Cautionary Tale on the Critical Importance of Intellectual
Property Protection, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 887, 889 (2002).
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infringement lawsuits. 105 By “free riding” on others’ inventions, Indian
companies avoided R&D costs. 106 By focusing on existing
pharmaceuticals, Indian pharmaceutical companies were able to offer
generic alternatives at a fraction of the patented name-brand
pharmaceutical cost, and thus India quickly entered both the local and
global pharmaceutical markets. 107
The policy to exclude product patents for pharmaceuticals allowed
the Indian pharmaceutical industry to grow rapidly. However, by joining
the WTO, India agreed to adopt the TRIPS Agreement, which required
India to implement patent protection for both pharmaceutical products
and processes. 108 After a three-stage amendment process in 1999, 2002,
and 2005, India finally entered into a TRIPS-compliant patent regime on
January 1, 2005. 109 Thus, India took advantage of the entire transition
period.
The impact of stronger intellectual patent rights was felt by larger
Indian drug firms and damaged smaller local firms’ abilities to meet the
rising costs of production and the payment of royalties for patented
pharmaceuticals. 110 The Indian TRIPS-compliant patent law was
criticized by public health groups as “likely to bring about a legal regime
that is less favorable from the point of view of access to drugs for the
people of [India].” 111 These groups also argue that the new patent law in
India generally provides stronger protection to patent holders, which
implies that the balance of interests between inventors and the general
public has shifted in favor of the inventor. 112
However, India tried to preserve public health by incorporating
TRIPS flexibilities such as stricter patent standards, pre-grant and postgrant opposition procedures, compulsory licenses and government use,
prior-use exceptions, early working or Bolar exceptions, research and
experimental use exceptions, parallel imports, and limiting data
protection. 113
The Indian patent opposition provision contains 11 grounds for pre105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 889, 894.
108. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 27.
109. See Janice Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s
Patent System and The Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 495
(2007).
110. Id. at 533.
111. See Rajdeep Goswami, Compliance of TRIPS in Indian Patent Law, LEGAL SERVICES
INDIA (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/article/compliance-of-trips-inindian-patent-law-1103-1.html.
112. Id.
113. See generally Ram, supra note 8.
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grant opposition and also permits post-grant opposition. 114 The Indian
grounds for post-grant opposition are broad enough to challenge novelty,
inventive steps and the process of industrial application, the best method,
claims and disclosure of origin, and even the use of indigenous or local
knowledge. 115 LDCs could learn from this broad Indian model and adopt
more extensive pre-grant grounds for objection as well as a process for
post-grant opposition.
India also tried to set high thresholds with respect to the novelty of
patent applications so that multinational corporations could not extend
the life of a patent by making small changes, a process known as “evergreening.” 116 In 2006, a Swiss-based pharmaceutical company, Novartis
AG, challenged the constitutional validity of section 3(d) of the Indian
Patent Act, which excluded inventions that were not a “significant
enhancement of the known efficacy” of the pharmaceutical.117 Novartis
AG alleged that the provision provided absolute power to the controller
of the patent and denied the rights existing under article 27 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which obliged WTO member states to provide patent
protection to all fields of technology without discrimination. 118 The
Indian High Court of Madras held that section 3(d) was not in violation
of the Constitution of India and declined to rule on its incompatibility
with the TRIPS Agreement. 119
Government use flexibility is another effective means to curb abuse
of patents. A government, or its authorized agent, can use the patents
without the patent holder’s authorization. The Indian Patent Act of 2005
provides for three types of government use. First, a patent is granted in
India with a condition that the government can import the medicines for
distribution in public-sector hospitals or any other hospitals. 120 Second,
the government or authorized persons can use a patent against a royalty
payment. 121 Third, the government can acquire a patent after paying
114. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2012), § 25.
115. See Archana Shanker & Neeti Wilson, The Patent Opposition System in India, INTELL.
ASSET MAG., 14, 16 (July 8, 2010), available at http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/
article.ashx?g=4ed76a24-e544-4547-a651-84c0542aecd1.
116. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2012), § 3(a), (d), (e), (p).
117. Novartis A.G. v. Union of India and Others, (2007) 4 M.L.J. 1153 (India), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/456550/High-Court-order-Novartis-Union-of-India.
118. Id. Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, states that “patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application . . . [P]atents
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the
field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.”
119. Novartis A.G., supra note 117.
120. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2012), § 47.
121. Id. §§ 99, 100.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014

17

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 7 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 1

78

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[7:61

compensation. 122 The government may exercise these powers at any
time. 123 The patented article, as produced under government use
flexibility, can only be sold for non-commercial use. 124 However, the
Act provides room for challenging the government decision to use or
acquire the invention in the High Courts. 125 This means that the patentee
could delay such government use, because the Act provides that the
government must prove its need before the Court.126
India also incorporated options concerning compulsory licenses for
use in cases of public interest. 127 Based on the earlier experiences of
Brazil, India uses compulsory licensing options to encourage local
production in case of inadequate supply or excessive price of particular
medicines. 128 This has effectively and consistently managed to control
the costs of several patented drugs by constantly threatening use of the
“national emergency” clause provided for under the TRIPS Agreement
with regard to compulsory licensing. 129
Furthermore, the Indian Controller of Patents, while disposing of an
application for a compulsory license in Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer
Corporation, clarified the issue of working the patent in the territory of
India. 130 The Controller noted that the phrase, “worked in the territory of
India,” was not defined in the Indian Patent Act; thus, he had to interpret
the phrase with regard to “various International Conventions and
Agreements in intellectual property,” the 1970 Patent Act, and the
legislative history. 131 The Controller, using article 27(1) of TRIPS and
article 5(1)(A) of the Paris Convention, adopted the interpretation that
failure to manufacture in India supported the grant of a compulsory
license to Natco: “[p]atents are not granted merely to enable patentees to
enjoy a monopoly for importation of the patented article and . . . the
grant of a patent right must contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology.” 132
Nevertheless, “gaps in the [Indian patent] law take away the
122. Id. § 102.
123. Id. § 100(1).
124. Id. § 100(6).
125. Id. §§ 100, 103.
126. Id. §§ 100, 103.
127. Dipika Jain & Jonathan J. Darrow, An Exploration of Compulsory Licensing as an
Effective Policy Tool for Antiretroviral Drugs in India, 23 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 425, 431
(2013).
128. Id. at 443.
129. See id. at 436.
130. Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp., Compulsory Licensing Application No. 1 of 2011
(decided by the Controller of Patents, Indian Patent Office, Mar. 9, 2012).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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effectiveness of a compulsory license regime under the Patents Act. As a
result, during the last five years only one application was filed for the
issuance of a compulsory license in India.” 133 One limitation in the
Indian compulsory licensing regime, for example, is that there is no clear
guideline with respect to the requirement to pay royalties. 134
The Indian patent law amendment of 1999 provided for the early
working or Bolar exception provision to ensure quick entry of generics
into the market for competition and hence reduce the price of medicines
in India. 135 The 1999 amendment also included a provision on parallel
importation by incorporating section 107(A)(b) into the Patent Act. 136
Under this section, parallel importation is permitted when the
“importation of patented products by any person [is] from a person who
was duly authorized by the patentee to sell or distribute the product.” 137
However, this required authorization from the patentee. 138 The result
was that a product could not be imported when the product was
produced under a compulsory license. 139 This was resolved by a 2005
amendment that enables India to import pharmaceuticals even when the
drugs are produced under a compulsory license. 140
Indian patent law also contains a provision on research and
experimental use that allows for the use of patented products for R&D
purposes. 141 Another feature of the Indian law is the provision under
prior-use exceptions, or the grandfather clause, which allows generic
producers to continue the production and marketing of a generic product
if they can show they significantly invested in it before January 1, 2005,
when the product patent was first introduced in India. 142 However, if any
prior use is approved, then the company is required to pay the patent
holder a reasonable royalty. 143
Furthermore, India maintains a price-control mechanism to ensure
access to affordable medicines. 144 However, a taskforce popularly
known as Dr. Pronab Sen Taskforce, formed by the government of India
to evaluate drug control mechanisms, contends that drug control
133. Gopakumar, supra note 7, at 341.
134. Id.
135. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2012), § 107(A).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 107(A)(b).
138. Id. § 48.
139. Id.
140. Id. § 107(A).
141. The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (2012), § 47 (retained as it is in the TRIPScompliant Indian Patent law of 1999).
142. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2012), § 11(A)(7).
143. Id.
144. See Gopakumar, supra note 7, at 352.
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mechanisms in India are not effective. 145 The taskforce argued that
no price regulatory mechanism can be effective unless there is a credible threat of price controls being imposed and enforced. However, it is
also felt that the present price control system is inappropriate, inade146
quate, cumbersome and time consuming.

The taskforce further recommended that price controls should be
imposed, not on the basis of turnover, “but on the ‘essentiality’ of the
drug and on strategic considerations regarding the impact of price
control on the therapeutic class.” 147 It stated that the “ceiling prices of
regulated drugs should normally not be based on cost of production, but
on readily monitorable market-based benchmarks.” 148 The taskforce also
recommended implementing a process for active promotion of generic
drugs, including mandatory de-branding for selected drugs and requiring
all public health facilities to prescribe and dispense only generic drugs,
except where no generic alternative exists.149 It further recommended
that in “the case of proprietary drugs, particularly anti-HIV/AIDS and
cancer drugs, the government should actively pursue access [programs]
in collaboration with drug companies with differential pricing and
alternative packaging, if necessary.” 150
India also utilizes traditional medicinal knowledge in the country to
ensure access to affordable medicines and has embarked on
documenting this traditional knowledge to prevent misappropriation by
multinational corporations. 151 Multinational corporations also put
pressure on India to introduce test-data protection, which is submitted to
get marketing approval; thereby, these corporations have attempted to
extend their monopoly pricing beyond the patent term. 152
[A]n analysis of article 39 of TRIPS and its legislative history indicates
that TRIPS speaks of data protection in a flexible manner, and does not

145. TASK FORCE TO EXPLORE OPTIONS OTHER THAN PRICE CONTROL FOR ACHIEVING THE
OBJECTIVE OF MAKING AVAILABLE LIFE-SAVING DRUGS AT REASONABLE PRICES, REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE GOV’T OF INDIA DEPT. OF CHEM. & PETROCHEM 26 (2005), available at
http://www.pharmaceuticals.gov.in/mshT2810/FTY3.pdf.
146. Id. at 53.
147. Id. at 29.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 37, 53.
150. Id. at 54.
151. See V.K. Gupta, Chairman, Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, TK Documentation
and Defensive Protection: An Example from India, Presentation at the WIPO International
Symposium 5 (June 26-28, 2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tken/
wipo_tk_mct_11/wipo_tk_mct_11_ref_t_5_1.pdf.
152. See Will Indian Patent Case End Drugs Companies Monopoly, EHOSPICE (May 2, 2013),
http://www.ehospice.com/ArticleView/tabid/10686/ArticleId/4530/language/en-GB/View.aspx.
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mandate data protection to be implemented by bringing in a data exclusivity regime. Thus, the argument that data exclusivity must be provided for in Indian law for India to be in compliance with TRIPS is fallacious. Protection against ‘unfair commercial use’ under TRIPS must
be interpreted to mean protection through non-disclosure and prohibiting others from accessing test data for unfair commercial use. TRIPS
gives member states the freedom to choose the nature and extent of
153
protection they want to offer.

That is why most of the Indian pharmaceutical companies claimed
that protection need not be in the form of data exclusivity, and therefore,
the government of India provided no data exclusivity protection. 154 In
2002, the Indian government also enacted the Competition Act, which
may be utilized to prevent abuses of patents, abuses of dominant market
positions, and excessive pricing. 155
India’s experience of utilizing TRIPS flexibilities and other
governmental intervention options, such as price control, could be
utilized by LDCs like Bangladesh when adopting TRIPS-compliant
patent law.
IV. THE EXPERIENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA
The South African struggle for access to medicines in the context of
TRIPS and pressure from multinational corporations could also be an
important consideration for LDCs—especially with regard to
competition law. Compared to India and Brazil, South Africa has a
larger health crisis to deal with, including a large number of HIV/AIDS
patients and problems with access to medicines. That is why “the case of
South Africa, economically the strongest African country, is particularly
illustrative of this public health crisis and showcases the role domestic
153. Animesh Sharma, Data Exclusivity with Regard to Clinical Data, 3 INDIAN J. OF L. &
TECH 82, 102 (2007).
154. See Shamnad Basheer, Indian Government Committee Says “No” to Data Exclusivity,
SPICYIP (June 6, 2007), http://spicyip.com/2007/06/indian-government-committee-says-no-to.html
(“After multiple deliberations spanning more than 3 years, a government committee has finally
submitted its report on regulatory data protection and Article 39.3 of TRIPS. It finds that Article
39.3 does not require ‘data exclusivity’ and that, at the present moment, it may not be in India’s
national interest to grant ‘data exclusivity’ to pharmaceutical drug data. It relies heavily on the Doha
Declaration to support this interpretation.”).
155. See generally Abhilash Chaudhary, Compulsory Licensing of IPRS and Its Effect on
Competition (2012) (unpublished research project), available at http://cci.gov.in/images/
media/ResearchReports/Compulsory%20Licensing%20of%20IPRs%20and%20Its%20Effect%20on
%20Competition.pdf. However, until now no successful attempt has been made to use competition
law in the pharmaceutical sector. Having a national competition law, India may well embrace the
South African experience and apply competition law to the pharmaceutical sector in order to
prevent excessive pricing, if that kind of situation were to arise in India.
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and international patent law and policies may play in this context.” 156
South Africa has a large and highly developed pharmaceutical
system, including considerable local production capacity. 157 The South
African Medicines Control Council licensed more than 200 entities as
manufacturers, importers, or exporters of medicines by 2008. 158 Africa
imports 70% of the medicines it uses, including 80% of its ARV drugs
used to treat HIV/AIDS. 159
On the other hand, South Africa has had patent legislation since at
least 1916, and the existing Patents Act was promulgated in 1978. 160
South Africa undertook TRIPS compliance in 1997 with the passage of
the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act. 161 South Africa also
became bound by the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1999. 162 Further
amendments to the Patents Act were made in 2002 and 2005. 163
Although South Africa adopted TRIPS-compliant patent law in
principle, it was increasingly contended that medicines already subject to
a significant degree of regulation must be construed as public goods
because of their critical public health and public interest impacts, 164 and
therefore, TRIPS flexibilities should be used to ensure that patent law
did not jeopardize public health concerns. 165 Countries such as South
Africa and Brazil attracted the wrath of the United States when they
adopted TRIPS-compliant laws that used TRIPS flexibilities more

156. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 2.
157. See Yu-Fang Wen & Thapi Matsaneng, Patents, Pharmaceuticals and Competition:
Benefiting from an Effective Patent Examination System, Presented at the Competition
Commission’s Seventh Annual Conference on Competition Law, Economics & Policy 1 n.4 (Sept.
5,
2013),
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Seventh-Annual-Conference-onCompetition-Law-Economics-Policy/Parallel-3B/Patents-Pharmaceuticals-and-Competition-YuFang-Wen-and-Thapi-Matsaneng-Annual-Competition-Conference-2013.pdf.
158. REPORT OF THE MINISTERIAL TASK FORCE TEAM ON THE RESTRUCTURING OF
MEDICINES REGULATORY AFFAIRS AND MEDICINES CONTROL COUNCIL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE NEW REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR HEALTH PRODUCTS OF SOUTH AFRICA 22 (2008),
http://pharmaceuticals.gov.in/drpronabreport.pdf.
159. African Leaders Call for Greater Industrialization of an Emerging Africa, UNAIDS
(Mar.
26,
2013),
http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2013/
march/20130326cotedivoire/.
160. Patents Act 9 of 1916 (S. Afr.); Patents Act 57 of 1978 (S. Afr.).
161. Patents Amendment Act 38 of 1997 (S. Afr.).
162. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
163. Patents Amendment Act 20 of 2005 (S. Afr.); Patents Amendment Act 58 of 2002 (S.
Afr.).
164. See Public Health Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/publichealth-ethics/.
165. See generally Patrick Bond, Globalization, Pharmaceutical Pricing, and South African
Health Policy: Managing Confrontation with U.S. Firms and Politicians, 29 INT’L J. OF HEALTH
SERVICES 765 (1999); Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 469 (2002).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol7/iss2/1

22

Azam: The Experiences of TRIPS

2014]

THE EXPERIENCES OF TRIPS

83

broadly than the United States wanted. 166
The significance of the South African experience with
pharmaceutical patent issues under the TRIPS Agreement goes beyond
doctrinal issues. It not only used legislative approaches under the patent
law but also used competition law and other governmental intervention
for price bargaining to encourage local generic production and R&D
based pharmaceutical industries. “[I]t touches upon the more
fundamental question of to what extent WTO Member States – in
general and particularly, developing countries – should be free to take
legislative measures to deal with public health crises and to what extent
the patent protection of pharmaceuticals required under TRIPS should
limit the range of options available.” 167 The South African experience
brought the potential tension between patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and public health concerns to the forefront of public
awareness and triggered “a global debate about what should be allowed
and what should be prohibited under TRIPS in order to preserve the
incentives for investments in R&D of pharmaceuticals, while still
allowing countries the flexibility to respond to public health crises as
they deem fit.” 168
The vast majority of South Africans did not have access to health
care at all, making health care reform one of the prime concerns for the
post-apartheid government. 169 This paralleled the mandate within South
Africa’s newly-adopted Constitution to take substantial policy measures
to ensure access to affordable health care for its citizens. 170 Accordingly,
the post-apartheid government appointed a National Drug Policy
Committee to revamp South Africa’s health care system. 171 After a
series of investigations and consultations with relevant stakeholders, the
Committee found that some of the most notable deficiencies were the
lack of equity in access to essential drugs, the comparatively high prices
for pharmaceuticals in the private sector, and the loss of drugs through
poor security in the public sector. 172
The pharmaceutical companies in South Africa disapproved the
findings and argued that even lowering drug prices would not solve the
166.
167.
168.
169.

See Bond, supra note 165, at 769; Abbott, supra note 165, at 471.
Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 13.
Id. at 14.
See Bronwyn Harris et al., Inequities in Access to Health Care in South Africa, 32 J. PUB.
HEALTH POL’Y 102, 103 (2011), available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jphp/
journal/v32/n1s/full/jphp201135a.html.
170. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 2-3 (citing S. AFR. CONST., 1996).
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing S. AFR. DEPT. OF HEALTH, NAT’L DRUG POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICA 9-10
(1996) (referencing drug pricing)).
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access problem, as South Africa did not have an adequate infrastructure
for the distribution of drugs. 173 The South African companies referred to
India as an example of a country where access was and is an issue,
despite the availability of generic versions of AIDS drugs. 174
However, considering excessive pricing of medicines by the
multinational corporations in South Africa, the government inserted a
new section 15C into the South African Medicines and Related
Substances Control Act (MRSCA). 175 The primary purpose of this
amendment was to enable South Africa to benefit from lower prices
abroad for the same drugs. 176 The enactment of MRSCA, with its
provisions for parallel importation, raised serious criticism by the
supporters of patent protection for the pharmaceutical industries (as they
considered it among the options for issuing compulsory licensing) and
received strong support from the public health groups. 177 Nevertheless,
the planned modifications, including section 15C, were signed into law
by President Nelson Mandela on December 12, 1997. 178
In an attempt to delay or halt implementation of the amendments,
the pharmaceutical companies challenged the constitutionality of the
amended MRSCA before the High Court of South Africa in February
1998. 179 While challenging section 15C, the plaintiffs argued: (i) the
amended provision entailed an inappropriate delegation of powers to the
executive branch of government, as the Minister of Health was
authorized to determine the application of patent rights irrespective of
the South African Patents Act and to determine the conditions for the
supply of more affordable medicines without any limiting guidelines; (ii)
that it would empower the Minister of Health to deprive intellectual
property owners of their property without compensation in violation of
article 25 of the South African Constitution (which provides for the
protection of property rights); and (iii) that it would violate the
obligation under Article 27 of TRIPS, and as South Africa committed to
meet TRIPS obligations, it would also violate articles 44(4), 231(2), and
173. See Sabin Russell, New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs/Africa’s Needs at Odds with
Firms’ Profit Motive, SFGATE, (May 24, 1999, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/
New-Crusade-To-Lower-AIDS-Drug-Costs-Africa-s-2929307.php.
174. Id.
175. Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997, REPUBLIC OF
S. AFR. GOV’T GAZETTE (Dec. 12, 1997) (amending the Medicines and Related Substances Control
Act No. 101 of 1965, as amended by Act Nos. 65/1974, 17/1979, 20/1981 and 94/1991).
176. Id.
177. The planned modifications, including section 15C, were signed into law by President
Nelson Mandela on December 12, 1997. See id.
178. Id.
179. See Notice of Motion in the High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division),
Case No. 4183 (1998).
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231(3) of the South African Constitution. 180
However, the South African government defended its amended
legislation stating that section 15C was constitutional as it granted the
Minister of Health only limited powers to abrogate patent rights, and
“under the South African Constitution it had an obligation to protect its
citizens’ right to health.” 181 Further, it claimed that section 15C was
consistent with TRIPS, arguing that TRIPS allows parallel imports and
that section 15C did not address the issue of compulsory licensing. 182
The South African Government alleged that it was being held to a
“TRIPS-plus” standard, and therefore a higher level of patent protection
beyond the requirements of TRIPS, both by the U.S. government and by
the private plaintiffs in the lawsuit. 183 The constitutional challenge over
the amended MRSCA had the effect of temporarily staying its
implementation. 184
The contentious position by the public health activists and
pharmaceutical companies in South Africa regarding MRSCA was
explained in a study:
[W]hile AIDS activists such as the South African Treatment Access
Campaign (TAC) called for international protests against ‘drug profiteering’ and claimed that delaying the implementation of the amended
MRSCA would only cost additional lives, the pharmaceutical companies defended the court action on the grounds that ‘parallel importation
of drugs would undermine the ability of pharmaceutical companies to
charge different prices in different parts of the world’ and that a ‘tiered
pricing strategy allows wealthier countries to subsidize poorer ones,
185
and the drug companies still get profits they need for research.’

Supporting the position of the South African Government, the thenHealth Minister of South Africa stated, “[w]e are not intending to bust
any patents. [We are] not intending to break any treaties. All we want to
do is to give health services to the people who are poor in this country,

180. Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4; see also Tshimanga Kongolo, Public Interest versus the
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Monopoly in South Africa, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 609, 616-19
(2001).
181. See Holger Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to
Medicines, OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE, 2008, at 12, available at http://isusstiftung.de/attachments/article/60/Background_of_the_Debate.pdf.
182. See Joint Study by the WHO and the WTO Secretariat, WTO Agreements & Public
Health 106 (2002), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/who_wto_e.pdf.
183. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 6 (citing Statement by the South African
Delegation, Minutes of the Council for TRIPS Special Discussions on Intellectual Property and
Access to Medicines, IP/C/M/31 (July 10, 2001)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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and to the people who have been denied those health services for
centuries.” 186
But the pharmaceutical companies viewed section 15C as a threat to
their business, and they feared that the explicit authorization of parallel
imports could turn into an example for other countries. 187 The
multinational corporations, mostly led by the United States
pharmaceutical industry, strongly opposed the enactment of section 15C
and asserted that it was tantamount to a complete abrogation of patent
rights and was leading to a violation of South Africa’s obligations under
the TRIPS Agreement. 188 A representative of Bristol-Myers Squibb
stated: “Patents are the lifeblood of our industry. Compulsory licensing
and parallel imports expropriate our patent rights”; the only beneficiary
of the erosion of patents would be the generic drug industry. 189
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), a trade group representing the United States pharmaceutical
industry, managed to convince the United States government that the
issue was sufficiently important to warrant putting pressure on South
Africa to repeal the contested legislative measures.190 James Joseph,
United States Ambassador to South Africa at that time, wrote a letter to
representatives of the South African government, strongly urging South
Africa to alter section 15C and stating that “my Government opposes the
notion of parallel imports of patented products anywhere in the
world.” 191 As a result, “South Africa was put on the Special 301 ‘watch
list’ both in 1998 192 and 1999 193 upon a determination by the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) that South Africa lacked adequate intellectual
property protection to an extent that merited bilateral attention.” 194 By
placing South Africa on the watch list, there was a possibility the United
States could impose unilateral trade sanctions on South Africa. 195
186. Id. at 7.
187. Id.
188. American subsidiaries accounted for 27% of the pharmaceutical market in South Africa,
which was a higher share of the market than South Africa’s local pharmaceutical industry. See
Lynne Duke, Nkosazana Zuma – Activist Health Minister Draws Foes in South Africa, WASH.
POST, Dec. 11, 1998, at A41.
189. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 5.
190. Id. at 7; South Africa’s Health Committee Rejects MRSCA Bill Change, PHARMA LETTER,
Oct. 21, 1997.
191. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 5.
192. Id. at 7.
193. 1999 USTR Special 301 Report (also stating that “South Africa’s Medicines Act appears
to grant the Health Minister ill-defined authority to issue compulsory licenses, authorize parallel
imports, and potentially otherwise abrogate patent rights”). Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 7
n.34.
194. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 7.
195. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2012).
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However, the United States did not bring a WTO case against South
Africa due to a huge public health campaign both inside and outside the
United States and the possible negative publicity. 196 The role of the then
presidential candidate Al Gore was also important, as he was cochairman of the United States/South Africa Binational Commission. 197
He had been actively involved in pressuring South Africa to give in to
the demands of the pharmaceutical industry, as he had become one of
the main targets of AIDS activists who had long urged the United States
government to change its policy towards South Africa. 198 In April 2001,
the pharmaceutical companies dropped their court challenge to section
15C and agreed to cover the South African government’s legal expenses
in the face of what has been described as a public relations nightmare.199
Behind the scenes discussions leading to withdrawal of the lawsuit
involved Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, who
was contacted by Jean-Pierre Garnier, the CEO of GlaxoSmithKline, on
behalf of the largest pharmaceutical companies, to broker a deal with
Thabo Mbeki, the President of South Africa. 200 The European Union and
the World Health Organization supported South Africa’s position. 201 As
part of the deal, South Africa reiterated its pledge to comply with TRIPS
when implementing the amendments to the MRSCA and invited the
pharmaceutical industry to help draft future regulations. 202
South Africa’s position reflected a struggle between excessive
pricing of patented medicines by the pharmaceutical companies and
societal and constitutional obligations to ensure access to medicines and
the right to health care. It also fairly represented the broader
international struggle over the scope of and exceptions to
internationally-recognized intellectual property rights under the TRIPS

196. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 8.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. As some journalists put it, “Can the pharmaceuticals industry inflict any more damage
upon its ailing public image? Well, how about suing Nelson Mandela?” Helene Cooper & Scott
Hensley, AIDS Epidemic Puts Drug Firms In a Vise: Treatment vs. Profits, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2,
2001, 10:47 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB983487988418159849.
200. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 9.
201. See Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS Medicine, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/world/drug-makers-drop-south-africasuit-over-aids-medicine.html?pagewanted=all.
202. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 10. But due to numerous legal and political
challenges, such as settlement of court cases, delays in the formation of a pricing committee and
effective implementation of MRSCA only began in 2007. See Ann M. Simmons, Firms Clear Way
for Cheaper AIDS Drugs, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 20, 2001), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-0420/news/0104200289_1_cheaper-aids-drugs-health-minister-manto-tshabalala-msimang-standardtriple-therapy. See also Cooper & Hensley, supra note 197; Swarns, supra note 201.
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Agreement. 203
This South African case reflects that the issue of parallel imports is
a matter left to the individual WTO member state to decide. Although
MRSCA provided an option for parallel imports, the South African
patent law did not make explicit provisions for it.204 In general, section
45(1) of the Patents Act stated that the patent owner had the right to
exclude others from importing the invention to which the patent relates
during the duration of the patent. 205
However, an amendment in 2002 added section 45(2), which
provides for the exhaustion of rights. 206 But it also does not contain any
wording that indicates international exhaustion, or parallel importation,
is permitted. 207 That is why South Africa issued a draft national policy
on September 4, 2013, which proposes changing South Africa’s
intellectual property laws to adopt a number of health safeguards,
including an easy to use parallel importation mechanism. 208 The
nonexistence of international exhaustion for parallel imports was also
confirmed by an announcement on November 5, 2013, by the
Department of Trade and Industry of South Africa, which noted that the
Patents Act, as it stands, does not address pricing of medicines, despite
the fact that the National Policy on Intellectual Property seeks to address
such matters. 209 It further noted that South Africa will amend its
legislation to address issues of parallel importation and compulsory
licensing in line with the Doha Decision of the WTO on Intellectual
Property and public health. 210
Most countries and commentators agree with South Africa that

203. See generally HEINZ KLUG, Pharmaceutical Production and Access to Essential
Medicines in South Africa, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PHARMACEUTICALS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
- ACCESS TO DRUGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 29-55 (Kenneth C. Shalen et al. eds., 2011).
204. This aspect was considered by the High Court in Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Agricura Ltd.
(1979) BP CP 168. The Judge confirmed that only national exhaustion was intended, and he found
nothing which would induce him to depart from this principle. See Esmé du Plessis & Danie
Dohmen, Exhaustion of Rights: A South African Perspective, Presentation at the WIPO Regional
Seminar for Certain African Countries on the Implementation and Use of Several Patent-Related
Flexibilities 15 (Jan. 29-31, 2013), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/patent_policy/
en/wipo_ip_dur_13/wipo_ip_dur_13_ref_tz14b.pdf.
205. Patents Act 57 of 1978 (S. Afr.) § 45(1).
206. Id. § 45(2).
207. See Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property 2013, at 6 (S. Afr.),
http://ipasa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/IPASA-Extracts-from-Submission-made-on-theDRAFT-NATIONAL-POLICY-ON-IPFalsepdf.
208. Id. at 6-8.
209. Tamar Kahn, South Africa ‘Seeks Balance’ Between Intellectual Property, Public Health,
BUSINESSDAY (Nov. 6, 2013, 1:54 PM), http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/health/2013/11/06/southafrica-seeks-balance-between-intellectual-property-public-health.
210. Id.
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article 6 of TRIPS is based on a country-by-country approach to the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights and parallel imports. 211 “This
view is based on a plain reading of the TRIPS Agreement as well as on
its drafting history.” 212 Although the issue of parallel imports was
discussed by the TRIPS negotiators, they failed to reach a consensus on
the subject: developing countries favored international exhaustion, the
United States advocated national exhaustion, and the European Union
tried to preserve the principle of European Union-wide exhaustion. 213
The South African controversy also centered on the question of
whether it was compatible with articles “30 and 31 in TRIPS for a WTO
member state to grant compulsory licenses to lower drug prices to
combat AIDS.” 214 Articles 30 and 31 in TRIPS set forth the conditions
for the validity of a domestic compulsory licensing scheme. 215 To the
extent that such a scheme does not “unreasonably conflict with the
normal exploitation of the patent” and does not “unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the patent owner,” it is legal under Article
30. 216 “If these general requirements are not met, however, the
compulsory licensing mechanism is only permissible if it complies with
the detailed prerequisites listed in Article 31.” 217 “In the context of South
Africa, pharmaceutical companies feared that the Minister of Health
could use the amended MRSCA to bypass these provisions to their
detriment and to the benefit of South African manufacturers of generic
drugs.” 218
But in reality, this has rarely happened – despite the fact that, in
addition to MRSCA, the South African Patents Act of 1978 provides an
avenue for the government and the courts to enforce compulsory
licenses. 219 Thus, despite having a huge health crisis and access
problems, South Africa has never used compulsory licenses. 220
211. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 439 (2005)
(regarding the drafting history of TRIPS, including parallel imports).
212. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 11.
213. Id.
214. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 13.
215. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 30, 31.
216. For example, in a case brought by the European Union against Canada, a WTO Panel
decided that Canada’s “pre-expiration testing” exemption was consistent with article 30 of TRIPS,
while its “stockpiling” exemption was not. See Report of the Panel, supra note 71, ¶ 8.1.
217. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 13.
218. Id.
219. Patents Act 57 of 1978 § 4 (S. Afr.) (“State bound by patent - A patent shall in all
respects have the like effect against the State as it has against a person: Provided that a Minister of
State may use an invention for public purposes on such conditions as may be agreed upon with the
patentee, or in default of agreement on such conditions as are determined by the commissioner on
application by or on behalf of such Minister and after hearing the patentee.”).
220. See Bayer’s Attempt to Block Generic Production of Sorafenib Rejected; Case on India’s
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The South African government has yet to make use of a statutory
power that entitles it to “use an invention for public purposes.” 221 If the
terms and conditions of such government use – which includes the
licensing of generic companies as a mechanism for reducing drug prices
– cannot be agreed upon, the state must approach the courts for
assistance. 222 There are no reported judgments on terms and conditions
associated with such compulsory licenses, which almost certainly
indicates that none have ever been granted. 223 It is true that the risk that a
licensee may itself become the target of litigation is an inhibition: nonissuance of a compulsory license is the primary source of reluctance to
antagonizing large competitors. 224 But if the regulatory framework was
easier (or less risky) to use, there seems little doubt that such licenses
would more readily be sought. 225
Due to the lack of a substantial patent examination and opposition
system, the South African patent office may grant patents that could
restrict entry of generic medicines. 226 The South African patent office
does not conduct a substantial patent examination like Brazil and India.
Therefore, it does not check novelty and non-obviousness of the
invention; it merely registers patents that fulfill the formalities set out for
First Compulsory License Still to be Heard in Court, FIX THE PATENT LAWS (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=420.
221. “State bound by patent - A patent shall in all respects have the like effect against the State
as it has against a person: Provided that a Minister of State may use an invention for public purposes
on such conditions as may be agreed upon with the patentee, or in default of agreement on such
conditions as are determined by the commissioner on application by or on behalf of such Minister
and after hearing the patentee.” Patents Act 57 of 1978 § 4.
222. “Compulsory licence in case of abuse of patent rights - (1) Any interested person who
can show that the rights in a patent are being abused may apply to the commissioner [a High Court
judge] in the prescribed manner for a compulsory licence under the patent.” In terms of § 56(2), the
rights in a patent are deemed to be abused if within a stated period of years there is without
satisfactory reason inadequate or no commercial exploitation; if demand is not being met adequately
and on reasonable terms; and if “by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a licence or
licences upon reasonable terms, the trade or industry or agriculture of the Republic or the trade of
any person or class of persons trading in the Republic, or the establishment of any new trade or
industry in the Republic, is being prejudiced, and it is in the public interest that a licence or licences
should be granted.” Id. § 56(2).
223. However, there are few reported decisions on court-granted compulsory licenses under
section 56 of the South African Patent Act. Three cited cases in this regard include: Syntheta (Pty)
Ltd (formerly Delta G Scientific (Pty) Ltd v. Janssen Pharmaceutica NV and Another 1999 (1) SA
85 (SCA) at 88I (S. Afr.); Sanachem (Pty) Ltd v. British Tech. Grp. plc 1992 BP 276, and Afitra
(Pty) Ltd and Another v. Carlton Paper of SA (Pty) Ltd 1992 BP 331. This provision was
successfully used in at least one matter to induce a major pharmaceutical company to grant a
voluntary licence. See Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 54.
224. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 38.
225. See generally David Vaver, Intellectual Property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes, 69
CAN. BAR REV. 98 (1990).
226. See Wen & Matsaneng, supra note 157, at 9.
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registration. 227
The absence of a local patent examination system means patents are
granted without substantive review and without verifying whether they
meet the patentability requirements provided for in the South African
Patents Act. 228 The patent office has no filter to ensure that patents are
granted only when they are deserved. 229 This undermines the country’s
ambition to provide free access to medicines and to boost local
production by its own generic industry. 230 This is a major drawback to
the patent application system in South Africa, because setting high
thresholds and strict examination of novelty character could give some
policy room for local generic producers to oppose patent applications for
pharmaceuticals. 231 It is considered that the multinational pharmaceutical
industry is fully exploiting this weakness in South Africa’s legal and
patent systems to extend market exclusivity on key medicines that are
nearing patent expiry. 232 According to one study, 2442 pharmaceutical
patents were registered in South Africa in a single year (2008). 233
Another loophole in the South African patent system is that South
African legislation makes no provision for pre-opposition procedures; it
limits the examination of applications and specifications to the Registrar
of Patents, who is empowered to grant the application if it complies with
the requirements of section 34 of the Patents Act. 234 However, inspection
by the public is permitted after the patent has been sealed and granted.235
Furthermore, there appears to be a complete lack of transparency in
the patent prosecution process, as the relevant statute merely requires the
registrar to engage in a formal tick-box approach to an application. 236
Given that patent grants, particularly in the case of essential medicines,
have such far-reaching impacts on the broader public, the process ought
to accommodate public scrutiny and comment. Due to the lack of pregrant opposition procedures and effective post-grant procedures, the
South African opposition procedure may not be helpful to local generic
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Why South Africa should Examine Pharmaceutical Patents, MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERES
ACCESS CAMPAIGN 11-12 (2013), available at http://www.msfaccess.org/content/why-south-africashould-examine-pharmaceutical-patents [hereinafter Examine Pharmaceutical].
231. ETHEL TELJEUR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ECONOMIC
REVIEW OF POLICY AND IMPACT 50 (2003).
232. Examine Pharmaceutical, supra note 230, at 12.
233. Id. at 2.
234. See David Cochrane, Patents and Public Health – The New Frontier, CIP (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://blogs.sun.ac.za/iplaw/2014/03/04/patents-and-public-health-the-new-frontier/.
235. Patents Act 57 of 1978 § 12 (S. Afr.).
236. Id. § 34.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014

31

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 7 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 1

92

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[7:61

producers.
Act 57 of the South African Patents Act of 1978 (as last amended in
2002) 237 covers most of the exclusions envisaged by article 27 of TRIPS,
namely: exclusions of patents on inventions that encourage offensive or
immoral behavior, as listed in section 25(4)(a); exclusions of patents for
any variety of animal or plant, or any essential biological process for the
production of animals or plants, not including a micro-biological process
or the product of such a process, as listed in section 25(4)(b); and
exclusion of patents on any surgical, therapeutic, or diagnostic method
of treatment of humans or animals, as listed in section 25(11). 238
Furthermore, section 36 of the Patents Act empowers the Registrar of
Patents to refuse any application that is frivolous or that encourages
illegal, immoral, and offensive behavior, including publication or
exploitation. 239 As the concepts of morality and offensive behavior are
relative concepts, particularly in a diverse and evolving society such as
South Africa, it is unclear how this provision is to be applied.
There are no general exemption provisions in South African patent
law such as the early use exception or the Bolar exception. South
African patent law also does not contain an explicit provision for
educational, experimental, or research exceptions, nor for the export of
an invention manufactured on a non-commercial scale in pursuance of
the early working exception. 240
Nevertheless, section 69A of the Patents Act was introduced by a
legislative amendment in 2002 and provides for a Bolar-type
exception. 241 As experimental use exception and Bolar-type exception is
not clear enough therefore may lead to varied interpretations and could
not be used by generic producers effectively and could lead to court
cases for delaying generic entry in the market. It is also noted that stockpiling of products made or imported under section 69A (1) is prohibited
by section 69A (2). 242
237. Id. § 57.
238. Id. § 25(11).
239. Id. § 36.
240. TELJEUR, supra note 231, at 51. Esmé Du Plessis, The Impact of Public Health Issues on
Exclusive Patent Rights, Report Q.202 (S. Afr.) (2008), AIPPI, https://www.aippi.org/
download/commitees/202/GR202south_africa.pdf.
241. Section 69A provides as follows: “It shall not be an act of infringement of a patent to
make, use, exercise, offer to dispose of, dispose of or import the patented invention on a noncommercial scale and solely for the purposes reasonably related to the obtaining, development and
submission of information required under any law that regulates the manufacture, production,
distribution, use or sale of any product. (2) It shall not be permitted to possess the patented
invention made, used, imported or acquired in terms of subsection (1) for any purpose other than for
the obtaining, development or submission of information as contemplated in that subsection.”
242. Plessis, supra note 240, at 2.
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On the other hand, there is no reference of test data protection
within the Patent Act’s protection of clinical trial data in South Africa,
which predates the Patent Act’s inclusion in the TRIPS Agreement. 243 In
line with the practice of regulatory authorities worldwide, the Medicines
Control Council (MCC) does not publicly disclose or share data
submitted for registration purposes. 244 But when considering an
application for the registration of a generic equivalent, the MCC does
not require the applicant to furnish any new data on the safety and
efficacy of the drug, but merely on the quality of the generic
equivalent. 245
Upon review of existing South African law, it is revealed that its
competition law provides a more effective sanction than its patent law
against patent abuse in the form of an anti-competitive compulsory
license, which is consistent with article 31(k) of TRIPS. 246 The South
African Competition Commission has already applied competition law
successfully in the pharmaceutical sector to deal with restrictive
practices and abuse of a dominant position. 247
In Hazel Tau and Others vs. GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer
Ingelheim, 248 the prices set by the two litigating companies were
considered an obstacle to accessing ARV medicines.249 The Competition
243. See Cecilia Oh, Domestic Legislation and Court Decisions on Intellectual Property
Rights and Public Health in South Africa 7 (2011), LOCAL-PHARMA-PRODUCTION.NET,
http://www.local-pharma-production.net/fileadmin/dateien/Country_studies/Country_analysis__South_Africa.pdf (noting that the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, No 101 of 1965,
controls the regulation of medicines in South Africa and does contain general confidentiality
provisions related to medicines. Sections 22B and 34, read together, suggest that there is general
protection of information submitted in respect of the regulation of medicines against unfair
commercial use. Again, section 22B permits the Director General of Health to disclose information
relating to medicines where it is deemed “expedient and in the public interest.”).
244. Id. at 4. See MEDICINES CONTROL COUNCIL, GENERAL INFORMATION 4 (2008), available
at http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/research/mccinfo.pdf.
245. See An Analysis of Patent, Competition and Medicines Law, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME:
USING LAW TO ACCELERATE TREATMENT ACCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 108 (Oct. 2013) (by Chan
Park, Achal Prabhala, & Jonathan Berger), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/l
ibrary/hivaids/English/using_law_to_accelerate_treatment_access_in_south_africa_undp_2013.pdf.
246. See Robert D. Anderson, Competition Policy and the TRIPS Agreement: More Guidance
Needed? Where Might We Look? What Insights from Policy Evolution at the National Level?,
Presentation at the WIPO Symposium on Intellectual Property and Competition Policy 8, 12 (May
11,
2010),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/meetings/en/2010/
wipo_ipcp_ge_10/presentations/anderson.pdf.
247. See Catherine Saez, UNDP Report Promotes Competition Law to Boost Access to
Medicines, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 19, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/05/19/undpreport-promotes-competition-law-to-boost-access-to-medicines/.
248. Dani Cohen & Jennifer Cohen, Competition Commission Finds Pharmaceutical Firms in
Contravention of the Competition Act, COMPETITION COMMISSION (Oct. 16, 2003),
www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/cc10162003.html.
249. In brief, the fact is that the pharmaceutical companies, GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer,
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Commission ruled that the companies had violated the Competition Act
of 1998 by denying “a competitor access to an essential facility, [setting]
excessive pric[es] and engag[ing] in an exclusionary act.” 250 Yet the
Commission stated that
[o]ur investigation revealed that each of the firms has refused to license their patents to generic manufacturers in return for a reasonable
royalty. We believe that this is feasible and that consumers will benefit
from cheaper generic versions of the drugs concerned. We further believe that granting licenses would provide for competition between
firms and their generic competitors. We will request the Tribunal to
make an order authorizing any person to exploit the patents to market
generic versions of the respondent’s patented medicines or fixed dose
combinations that require these patents, in return for the payment of a
251
reasonable royalty.

Even though the two companies denounced the complaint as
unfounded, they compromised with the Commission and granted
voluntary licenses to produce a generic version of their patented
pharmaceuticals. 252 Since this case, there has been substantial progress
in South Africa toward providing access to pharmaceuticals for patients
with HIV/ AIDS. 253
The South African model of competition law could be utilized by
developing countries and LDCs, including Bangladesh, to prevent
excessive pricing of medicines.
V. COMPARATIVE REVIEW AND LESSONS FOR LDCS INCLUDING
BANGLADESH
This analysis highlights that India, Brazil, and South Africa used
different options in their transition to a pharmaceutical patent regime and
TRIPS-compliant patent law. India and Brazil substantially revised
patent owners of ARV (HIV/AIDS) drugs, set unjustifiably high prices for these drugs in South
African markets. AZT (300 mg) is sold at $0.92 as compared to the WHO generic price of $0.25.
Compulsory licensing negotiation under the South African Patent Act proved futile as the
companies demanded a 25% royalty on sales as compared to the international rate of 4-5%. The
Competition Commission took action under section 8 of the South African Competition Act, which
prohibits “a dominant firm to charge an excessive price to the detriment of the consumers,” ordering
the issuance of licenses to market generic versions of the patented ARV drugs in return for the
payment of a reasonable royalty to be decided by the Competition Tribunal. See Fisher &
Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 52.
250. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 52.
251. Rachel Roumet, Access to Patented Anti-HIV/AIDS Medicine: The South African
Experience, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 137, 140 (2010).
252. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 54.
253. Roumet, supra note 251.
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national patent law using the flexibilities present in the TRIPS
Agreement. These flexibilities are also available to LDCs, such as
Bangladesh, as they move towards TRIPS compliance. The issues for
LDCs like Bangladesh are which flexibilities to adopt and when during
the transition process the chosen flexibilities should be utilized. The
different policy options taken by these countries can be represented
diagrammatically, as in Table 1.1 below.
Table 1.1: Policy Options Used by Brazil, India, and South Africa
TRIPS
Stages

Legislative
Position

India

Brazil

South
Africa

Remarks

Pre-TRIPS

1. No patent

To

Brazil

South Africa

India

protection for

encourage

eliminated

provided

allowed

pharma-

the generic

both process

both product

process

ceuticals

production

and product

and process

patents only

2. Process

of drugs

patents for

patents for

during the

patent only

and to

pharma-

pharma-

pre-TRIPS

3. Limited

develop

ceuticals
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regime,

duration for

imitating

without any

whereas

pharma-

capacity,

substantive

Brazil

ceutical patent

India

examination

eliminated

protection

prohibited

patent

product

protection

patents and

for pharma-

allowed

ceuticals

only

altogether;

process

South Africa

patents for

provided

pharma-

both product

ceuticals

and process

Process

patents even

patent for

during the

pharma-

pre-TRIPS

ceuticals

period

granted
only for
seven years
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Transitional

Utilization of

India

Brazil

South Africa

Brazil and

periods (until

full transition
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undertook to

South Africa

January 1,
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1996
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years before
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Property

the 2005

LDCs, which

patent law

Law 9.279)

deadline,
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in 2005

and

whereas

further
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9.Utilization

other hand, it

of traditional

provides test

medicinal

data

knowledge

protection

10. Competition law

The requirement to move toward TRIPS-compliant patent law has
created apprehension within Bangladesh. 254 The fear is that the price of
pharmaceuticals in the local market will increase and that local
pharmaceutical companies may not survive the high cost of royalties for
patented medicines and the need to compete with multinational
corporations. 255 In this regard, the experiences of Brazil, India, and
South Africa in utilizing the TRIPS flexibilities and other alternative
measures to balance innovation and access to pharmaceuticals should be
considered by Bangladesh and other LDCs.
The present patent regime in Bangladesh has no provisions to
effectively utilize the TRIPS flexibilities as India, Brazil, and South
Africa have done. Importantly, to utilize the flexibilities, consideration
will be necessary to amend Bangladesh’s Patents and Designs Act of
1911. 256 In addition to utilizing TRIPS flexibilities, the government of
254. Mohammad M. Azam & Kristy Richardson, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and
TRIPS Challenges for Bangladesh: An Appraisal of Bangladesh’s Patent Office and Department of
Drug Administration, 22 BOND L. REV. 1, 4 (2010).
255. Id.; see generally M. Monirul Azam, Globalizing Standards of Patent Protection in WTO
Law and Policy Options for the LDCs: The Context of Bangladesh, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
402 (2014).
256. Patent law in the Indian sub-continent, including Bangladesh, has its origin in the 19th
century, when it was under the rule of the British East India Company. The first legislation relating
to patents was enacted as Act VI of 1856 and was based on the British Patent Law of 1852.
Subsequently the power to rule the Indian subcontinent transferred from the East India Company to
the British Crown via the Government of India Act 1858. New legislation for granting “exclusive
privileges” for invention was introduced as Act XV of 1859. This legislation contained certain
modifications of the earlier legislation, namely the grant of exclusive privileges solely to useful
inventions and extension of the priority period from six months to 12 months. But this Act excluded
importers from the definition of inventor, and it was also substantially based on the British Patent
Act of 1852 with certain departures, which included allowing assignees to make applications in
India and also taking prior public use or publication in India or the United Kingdom for the purpose
of ascertaining novelty. Later, the British Government enacted the Patents & Designs Protection Act
of 1872 and also the Protection of Inventions Act of 1883. These two Acts were later consolidated
into The Inventions & Designs Act of 1888. Finally abolishing the earlier patent laws, the Indian
Patents & Designs Act of 1911 was enacted, consolidating all the patents and designs issues,
including establishment of the office of controller of patents and designs. Bangladesh adopted the
same law as established by the Patents and Designs Act of 1911, and Bangladesh’s law remains
unchanged today. See History of Indian Patent System, GOV’T OF INDIA,
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patents.htm (last visited July 27, 2013); see also MOHAMMAD
MONIRUL AZAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, WTO AND BANGLADESH (2008); see generally Azam,
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Bangladesh could adopt a competition law based on the experience of
South Africa and could also revise price control mechanisms based on
the experiences of India and Brazil. The Government of Bangladesh
enacted Competition Act, 2012 in June of 2012. 257 According to one
study, “[a] draft bill for such a law was first proposed in 1996; however,
it took sixteen years to finally come to fruition.” 258
The progress of the Competition Bill has been delayed: “the
political will to implement a competition law is limited, and there is
some opposition from business groups.” 259 “Indeed, competition
problems are potentially more serious in a country [such as Bangladesh]
with a weaker private sector, where one or a few dominant firms can
take control” and abuse their dominant position. 260 “The media
coverage . . . suggests [that] Bangladesh may suffer from significant
competition problems, with substantial costs to consumers” and to the
public health sector of Bangladesh, more particularly. 261
However, considering some weaknesses within South African
competition law, it is suggested that in any future Bangladeshi
competition law, the Competition Commission should have authority to
issue compulsory licenses, to recommend fixed royalty rates, and to
“expressly allow for the export of products produced under compulsory
licenses in order to maintain sustainable investment.” 262 In addition,
LDCs may also stipulate in national competition law that compulsory
licensing could be granted in cases of anticompetitive behavior, such as
in the case of a patent holder’s unilateral refusal to grant a license (i.e.,
refusal to deal). 263 Competition law could also be applied in the case of
obtaining pharmaceutical patents in an unjustified and fraudulent
manner. 264 The issues of “poor quality” and “frivolous” patents and
supra note 255.
257. RAFIA AFRIN & DANIEL SABET, WILL BANGLADESH’S NEW COMPETITION LAW PROVE
EFFECTIVE? 1 (2012), available at http://www.ulab.edu.bd/CES/documents/Competition_law_0712.pdf.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 2.
261. Id.
262. See Azam, supra note 255, at 462; TENU AVAFIA ET AL., TRADE LAW CENTRE FOR
SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE ABILITY OF SELECT SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO UTILISE
TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES AND COMPETITION LAW TO ENSURE A SUSTAINABLE SUPPLY OF ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES: A STUDY OF PRODUCING AND IMPORTING COUNTRIES 4-5 (2006).
263. See Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Exploration of Some Issues of Relevance
to Developing Countries, ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Issue Paper
No. 21, at 20 (2007) (by Carlos M. Correa), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/
resources/docs/corea_Oct07.pdf.
264. In fact, these patents should never be granted in the first place. But lack of proper
resources, expertise, and proper examination in LDCs may allow for such fraudulent registrations.
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regulatory practices, such as marketing approval and data exclusivity,
can also be controlled under competition law. 265
Furthermore, some existing research indicates that despite having
impressive sales and export growth, the local pharmaceutical industry in
Bangladesh – particularly after the introduction of the 1982 Drug
Control Ordinance – helped Bangladesh ensure the supply of generic
medicines at a lower price but limited the local industrial development
of innovative capacity for basic research and patenting of new
medicines. 266 On the other hand, lack of proper monitoring by the
Directorate General of Drug Administration in Bangladesh raises the
issue of quality medicines. 267 Also, a lack of expertise and required
resources in the Bangladeshi patent office raises the issue of capability
to deal with the pharmaceutical patent and TRIPS-compliant patent
law. 268
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study identified options used by Brazil, India, and South
Africa during the transition to a TRIPS-compliant patent regime. These
options enabled them not only to promote the local pharmaceutical
industry, but also to maintain access to medicines. The experiences of
India, Brazil, and South Africa in utilizing TRIPS flexibilities provide
important lessons for LDCs as they transition to TRIPS-compliant patent
law.
This study also explored how these countries utilized these options
to generate the right balance between the interests of the pharmaceutical
industry and the increased demand by the public for affordable
medicines. On this basis, the current position is that LDCs need to utilize
the benefit of the TRIPS transition period and must consider
technological and infrastructural limitations to lobby for the further
extension of transition periods. 269 The future of the pharmaceutical
industry in LDCs lies at the center of which legislative and policy
intervention options are taken by the Bangladeshi government to
implement a TRIPS-compliant patent law and to what extent local
industry could utilize TRIPS waiver periods to develop technological
and innovative skills for transition from a copycat nation to an

In these situations, competition law could play an important role.
265. See Correa, supra note 263.
266. Azam & Richardson, supra note 254, at 6.
267. Id. at 11-14.
268. Id. at 10.
269. Id. at 1-2.
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innovative nation. 270

270.

Id.
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